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Abstract
We model activism as it a¤ects the future distribution of prices in a portfolio con-
text with risk-averse expected utility of end-of-period wealth maximizing investors.
We characterize activism as a¤ecting the mean, the variance, and/or the covariance
of the target rms price with the prices of the other rms. This characterization
allows us to investigate conditions under which the activist would choose to become
an activist and, subsequently, to derive the sequence of equilibria that begins with
the surreptitious acquisition of shares by the activist and ends at the moment of the
activists divestiture of these shares. We investigate the impact of activism not only
on the target rms price over time and the activists prot, but also on the redistri-
bution of portfolio holdings of all market participants that this activism induces. We
propose a method to evaluate activism and show that, while activism may augment
the share price of the target rm, there exist conditions under which activism would
not necessarily increase the value of the market. Furthermore, we show that the
prot of the activist is at the expense of the group of other investors. We compare
our results to recent empirical ndings.
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Setting the Context
Recent empirical literature suggests a description of hedge fund activism that di¤ers
in a number of ways from the type of activism that has been studied extensively in the
past. In particular, this new form may be characterized as a sequence of equilibria,
elements of the sequence being provoked by the legal requirements of the release of
information. Also, at each time point in the sequence, all activity is determined
in a competitive market. Two other points pertinent to the distinction of hedge
fund activism are that the percentage of shares acquired by the activist in order to
pursue his agenda is relatively small, and that these excessive shares are sold within
a relatively short period of time.
We begin by describing these equilibria in more detail and noting di¤erences with
earlier models. Specically, we model activism as it a¤ects the future distribution of
prices in a portfolio context with risk-averse expected utility of end-of-period wealth
maximizing investors. We characterize activism as a¤ecting the mean, the variance,
and/or the covariance of the target rms price with the prices of other rms. This
characterization allows us to derive the sequence of equilibria that begins with the
surreptitious acquisition of shares by the activist, and ends at the moment of the
activists divestiture of these shares.
A key feature of the new empirical research is that the hedge fund activist (or
the entrepreneurial activist, for example, an individual investor or a private equity
rm) must acquire shares in the marketplace in order to become an activist.1 That
is, the starting point is not from that of a large blockholder as, for example, in
1See, for example, Kahan and Rock (2007, p. 1069) where they state "... it is noteworthy
that activist hedge funds usually accumulate stakes in portfolio companies in order to engage in
activism." Italics in original.
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the models of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Huddart (1993), Admati, Peiderer and
Zechner (1994), Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998). Rather, the initial
focus is on the surreptitious accumulation of shares to enable the potential activist
to acquire a su¢ cient equity stake in the target rm to be able to accomplish his
goal of causing management to alter its behavior. This share acquisition occurs in
a competitive market equilibrium. When that stake reaches the critical 5% percent
level of ownership, the potential activist has the obligation to le Schedule 13D with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 This ling announces the activists intent
to the marketplace. Importantly, since the ling of Schedule 13D within 10 days of
acquiring a 5% stake of the voting power of a registered security with the intent to
alter the policies of the current management is a legal requirement, the information in
the ling is not released for strategic purposes. But even when a hedge fund decides
to enter the market to acquire shares to pursue an activist agenda, it does not tend
to acquire a controlling block of shares (see Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur
(2009)). Moreover, it does not maintain even its non-controlling additional equity
stake for a lengthy period of time: the median holding period from ling Schedule
13D to exit (i.e., selling of excess shares) is approximately one year in duration (see
Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009)). Thus, the extensive literature on
activistsmonitoring, found in many models with large blockholders, does not o¤er
insights into this alternative behavior. Also, hedge fund and other entrepreneurial
investors are quite successful, accomplishing their goals roughly two-thirds of the
time (see Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008)), or even more (see Bratton
(2010)). Earlier studies did not nd such success (see Black (1998), Karpo¤ (2001)
2See, for example, Briggs (2007, p. 706): "...hedge fund activism with an ownership level below
the 5% Schedule 13D threshold only happens relatively rarely." Also note Greenwood and Schor
(2009, p. 2) who state "the activists need to acquire at least a 5% stake in order to most e¤ectively
push for a takeover with the public ling of the mandatory 13D."
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and Gillian and Starks (2007); see also Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008)
for a discussion of those earlier ndings). Finally, the shedding of excess shares when
the activism is concluded is typically via sales in the market place (see Brav et al.
(2008)). When the level of ownership sinks below the 5% level, another reporting
requirement is triggered and an amended Schedule 13D (Schedule 13D/A) must be
led, again alerting the market to this information.
In sum, it appears that hedge funds and other entrepreneurial activists currently
start from a position without signicant ownership in a rm they later target. Then,
they come to believe that they could prot by improving some aspect of the way
that rm operates. They subsequently commence accumulating a larger position in
that rm by purchasing its shares in the marketplace. Generally, hedge funds attain
somewhat more than the 5% ownership level that necessitates a ling of Schedule
13D. This ling makes the activists intent public. The activist then undertakes var-
ious tactics involving attempts to change the board of directors, change the business
strategy of the rm, change the capital structure, alter the dividend policy, divest
assets, etc. Within a year or so, the activist sheds his excess holdings in the target,
regardless of whether he has had success in achieving change. Generally this requires
a ling of Schedule 13D/A.
1.2 Related Literature
Brav et al. (2008), studying hostile and non-hostile hedge funds from 2001 to 2006,
and Klein and Zur (2009), studying confrontational hedge funds and other entre-
preneurial activists from 2003 to 2005, provide surveys of the evolution of activism
and present, in many cases, similar empirical ndings. Both nd that the price of
the target rm increases around the time of the Schedule 13D ling (in the range of
7% (Brav et al.) and 10% (Klein and Zur)), and that for a period of about a year
afterwards the boost in returns remains. Both conclude that the market tends to
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assess hedge fund activism as increasing shareholder value and suggest this is due to
a lessening of agency problems. Also, Brav et al. nd that the target rm exhibits
price declines only if the hedge fund fails in its e¤orts. On the other hand, Klein and
Zur nd that when activists are unsuccessful within the year horizon, the price of
the target rm increases less than when the activist is successful. A main empirical
nding of both Brav et al. and Klein and Zur is to show the reaction of a target rm
to activism, in particular, highlighting the increase in the average excess return that
is found around the time of the Schedule 13D ling and its persistence. It is primarily
on this basis that both studies posit activism benets target rm shareholders.
In a recent study of a single fund, the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund (HUKFF), over
the period 1998-2004, Becht et al. (2010) nd activism produces substantial benets
not only for HUKFF but also for the shareholders.3 The di¤erences in institutional
environments between the U.K. and the U.S. are described, and the U.K. threshold
level of 3% for disclosure is noted. Becht et al. do not nd the same type of behavior
of the target price around the announcement date that Brav et al. or Klein and Zur
nd.4 But Becht et al. do nd that, when the private "behind the scenes" negotiations
between the HUKFF and its targets are successful, abnormal returns net of fees of
4.9% against a benchmark were achieved. Furthermore, they nd that over 90% of
the excess returns can be attributed to activism.
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) also study the impact of activism on the perfor-
mance of both the activist fund and the target rms. They construct a data set to
permit such a study for the period 1994-2005 and, using Schedule 13D lings, nd
that hedge funds are successful in their activism at rates similar to those found by
Brav et al. and Klein and Zur. Boyson and Mooradian nd a longer average holding
3In their paper, the HUKFF is described as closer to a hedge fund or private equity investor than
a traditional institutional activist investor.
4They suggest this may be an artifact of reporting as HUKFF announcements may be di¢ cult
to separate from overall British Telecommunications pension fund announcements.
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period of the target rm by the activist than Brav et al. and Klein and Zur, while
nding that the target rm price increases in the short term. This compares with
Brav et al. and Klein and Zur who nd a sustained positive response to the Schedule
13D ling. Boyson and Mooradian also nd activist hedge funds earn 7-11% more
per year, risk-adjusted, than non-active hedge funds, and both activist hedge funds
and shareholders benet from activism.
Cli¤ord (2008), too, nds hedge fund activism benets shareholders and hedge
funds themselves. He introduces data on the lings of Schedule 13G (required when
the 5% threshold is reached but the stated intent is passive ownership) by hedge funds
and nds that, over the period 1998-2005, target rms for which Schedule 13D have
been led have 1.07% higher excess returns than those for which Schedule 13G have
been led.5 Cli¤ords nding that rms targeted for activist hedge fund involvement
earn larger excess returns than those targeted for passive hedge fund investment is
in line with the ndings of positive excess returns at Schedule 13D lings found by
Brav et al., Klein and Zur and Boyson and Mooradian. Again comparing Schedule
13D and 13G lings, Cli¤ord determines that when a hedge fund changes its stance
toward a target rm, necessitating a ling of Schedule 13D subsequent to a prior ling
of 13G, the targets excess return increases. The largest gains to hedge fund activism,
according to Cli¤ord, are associated with the sale of assets or the entire rm.
The role of the subsequent sale of assets of the target rm (including mergers
and the sale of the entire rm to the activist that targeted it for improvements in
corporate governance) is studied further by Greenwood and Schor (2009). For the
period 1993-2006, they consider Schedule 13D lings as well as denitive proxy state-
ments led with the SEC by non-management (DFANs) announcing the initiation of a
5Since the timing of Schedule 13G ling is more lax (45 days after the end of the calendar year
in which the 5% stake is acquired), Cli¤ord compares 13D to 13G lings made within 10 days of the
acquisition; see his Table IV, panel B.
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proxy battle. They show higher returns at the announcement of Schedule 13D lings,
with targets for which a merger or sale of all or part of its assets was announced or
completed within an 18-month period earning, on average, more than 5%, with the
complement group earning, on average, only 2.4%. These increases surrounding the
Schedule 13D announcements comport with those found by Brav et al., Klein and
Zur, Boyson and Mooradian, and Cli¤ord. Looking further at the grouping with no
takeovers announced or completed within an 18-month window, Greenwood and Schor
nd the only characteristic associated with a signicant positive abnormal return at
announcement is that of "spino¤s," and the return in this case is 6.4%. Switching
to a monthly rather than daily event analysis reveals that only the targets for which
announcements of either acquisition or completed acquisition have occurred within
an 18-month period experience a positive abnormal announcement return. In the
monthly analysis, the complement group (and all of its sub-categories) earns no sig-
nicant positive abnormal returns. Greenwood and Schor also show that the presence
of an activist increases the probability of a takeover.
Six other studies, Bratton (2007), Bratton (2010), Briggs (2007), Kahan and Rock
(2007), Stowell (2010, chapter 13), and Brenner (2008), provide valuable additional
depth and background on the phenomenon of hedge fund activism. They also supply
details on particular activist engagements and their outcomes.
In a related work on the initial behavior of a sovereign fund tasked with improving
corporate governance, Lee and Park (2009) take a di¤erent tact: they investigate the
impact of the announcement of a 5% stake in a target rm by the Korean Corporate
Governance Fund in August 2006 on the prices of non-target Korean rms.6 Lee and
Park document that there is no leakage before the announcement date, after which
6Although a regulatory ling must be made at the 5% level, no distinction between active and
passive intent need be specied in Korea. Lee and Park note, however, the activist intent of the
Korean Corporate Governance Fund was obvious.
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cumulative returns increase in the two chosen targets (see their Figure 1, and also
note that one target is the parent company of the other). They go on to show that,
while all non-target rms are positively a¤ected by the announcement, the non-target
rms having poorer governance provisions subsequently have larger abnormal returns.
1.3 Our Contributions
By their nature, however, the empirical studies just cited, with the exception of Lee
and Park, examine the marginal impact of hedge fund and other entrepreneurial
activism on specic targets, but all the studies have di¢ culty addressing a number
of broader issues. For example, under what conditions would an activist choose to
increase his risk exposure by devoting time and money to his activism? Why and in
what manner does the price of the target rm change over the course of the activists
involvement? How would activism a¤ect the entire portfolio holdings not only of the
activist but also of all other market participants? Why, if the activist should succeed
in his agenda, would he pare back his holdings within a relatively short period of
time? How does the value of the market change as a consequence of activism? How
might we evaluate the benets of activism in the presence of diversied shareholders?
In order to provide some answers to these questions, in this paper we present a
model in which we embed the activist and his target rm within a general market
of correlated rms over time. Our model permits us to trace the impact of activism
through the period of involvement of the activist in the target rm. This allows us
to address the preliminary decision of the activist to become an activist. Our results
exhibit the changes that occur not only on the target rms price and the activists
prot, but also the changes that occur in all investorsportfolios as a consequence of
activism. Furthermore, we can show how the markets value changes over the course
of activism and how the group of other investors fare over the same period. We nd
that the benets of activism expressed in the empirical literature have been broadly
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overstated.
We present our model in the Section 2. In Section 3 we analyze the criteria that
the activist uses in his decision to become an activist. We derive and compare the
forecasts of our model with the price movements described in the empirical literature
in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the impact of activism on the market and other
diversied investors. Discussion and conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 The Model
The model that we consider species four moments in time at which investors gather
together to compete for shares in rms for their portfolios. These moments are
distinguished by the information sets available to investors at each of these points in
time. At time t = 0, all participants hold the same view regarding the future values
of the rms, and come together to buy shares in these rms based on that commonly
held information. We refer to the set of portfolios determined in this manner as the
benchmark portfolios. We assume that the benchmark portfolios remain the same
until one of those investors, called the activist, comes to believe that his involvement
can improve the performance of a rm. With this new private information, the
activist must rst decide whether it would be protable for him to act on his private
information. If not, activism obviously does not occur. Should the decision to act
be taken, then the activist moves at time t = 1 to acquire shares to facilitate his
objective. This move precipitates a new competitive market equilibrium where the
activist acts on his private information while the views of all other investors concerning
the future values of the set of rms remain unchanged. If the activist is successful
in acquiring a su¢ cient number of shares then, at time t = 2; the activist les
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Schedule 13D.7 At the time of the ling, the investors become informed of the activists
intent to improve the performance of the rm. Having gained knowledge of the
activists intent, the remaining investors enter into a new competitive equilibrium
for shares. Here, the activist refrains from entering into trading since he needs the
shares he has already acquired to carry out his activist program. Subsequently, at
time t = 3, it becomes known to all market participants whether or not the activist
has been successful in his plans to improve the rm. This new information acquired
by all market participants induces a new competitive equilibrium with all investors
participating. Should the activists holdings fall su¢ ciently, he les an amended
Schedule 13D (Schedule 13D/A).8 Finally, at time T , all uncertainty concerning the
rms is resolved and all the rms are liquidated. In this section, we investigate these
equilibria and some of their consequences.
In each competitive market equilibrium, we assume that there exists the same
set of N risky assets and a riskless one. Each of the M risk-averse investors is a
price-taker and a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility of end-of-period wealth
maximizer. We now introduce some notation. Let xit be the N x 1 vector of shares
held by investor i, i = 1; :::;M; at time t; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; in the N rms. Let yit be
the amount investor i borrows (lends) at time t to facilitate purchases. Let epit be an
N x 1 vector of random prices per share of the N rms that would prevail at T as
perceived by investor i at time t, and let p0 be the price of the riskless asset. Let ui
be the utility function of investor i, wit be the wealth of investor i at time t and, for
convenience, let p0 = 1:
At time t; t = 0; 1; 2; 3, the equilibrium process is dened as follows. Taking the N
7When an owner acquires 5% or more of the voting power of a registered security, and has the
intent to attempt to alter the policies of the current management, SEC rules require that Schedule
13D (the so-called benecial ownership report), be led within 10 days.
8According to SEC regulations, if the activists holdings fall below the 5% threshold, Schedule
13D/A must be led promptly.
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x 1 vector pt as given, investor i determines xit which satises arg maxxit Eitui(yit +
x0itepit) s:t: yit + x0itpt = wit where Eit is the expectation of investor i at time t with
respect to the distribution of epit and a prime denotes a transpose operation. The
equilibrium price vector at time t, Pt; yields the demands xit so that all shares are
sold, i.e.,
MP
i=1
xit = Q where Q is the N x 1 vector whose elements are the total
number of shares in each of the N risky rms. For convenience, we normalize Q
and represent it by 1; an N x 1 vector whose elements are 1; so that xit represents
the vector of proportional ownership of investor i at time t in the N risky rms.
We assume that each investor has an exponential utility function with Pratt-Arrow
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion ai: We further assume that the random vectorepit is normally distribution with mean vector it and positive denite covariance
matrix 
it: With these assumptions, the equilibrium solution at each time t is the
solution to the nonhomogeneous portfolio problem derived in Rabinovitch and Owen
(1978). Furthermore, the trading that determines these equilibria takes place only
when new information becomes available. We use the results in Rabinovitch and
Owen to determine the explicit prices and holdings in the four competitive equilibria
we study here.
At time t = 0, all investors agree on their assessments of the distribution of prices
that will occur at T . Thus, in this case, i0 = 0 and 
i0 = 
0: We state this
well-known equilibrium solution result without proof in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. At time t = 0, i0 = 0 and 
i0 = 
0; i = 1; :::;M: Then the
equilibrium solution yielding the benchmark is xi0 =
di
d
1; i = 1; :::;M; and P0 =
0 1d
01 where di = 1ai and d =
P
di:
Following this market exchange, one of the investors comes to believe that, with
su¢ cient shares in a particular rm, he can improve its performance and thereby
prot from his activism. We designate this activist as investor 1; and the single rm
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that is the target of his interest as rm 1:9 Since we have assumed that all investors can
borrow, lend, as well as sell short, our activist must have these capabilities as well.
Thus, our model necessarily excludes mutual funds as activists, but includes both
hedge fund activists and other entrepreneurial activists such as individual investors,
and private equity funds.10
If the activist proceeds with his plan to acquire additional shares, it is done sur-
reptitiously, and it forces a new round of trading. This leads to a heterogeneous
information equilibrium whose solution is given in Proposition 2. The proof of this
proposition, and all following propositions and the lemma, can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 2. Let the distributional parameters for investor 1; the activist, be
11 = 0 +  and 
11 = 
0 + 
 and let those for investor i; i = 2; :::;M; be
i1 = 0 and 
i1 = 
0: Then, at t = 1; the equilibrium solution is given by
x11   x10 = (d  d1)
 10 (P1 P0)
xi1   xi0 =  di
 10 (P1  P0) for i = 2; :::;M; and
[dI + (d  d1)

 10 ](P1 P0) = d1( 
1=d):
We have assumed here that the intent of activism is to alter the future distribution
of prices of the risky assets. We next sharpen this assumption further. Since we
restrict activism to rm 1, we assume that activism may alter the future expected
value of the price of this target rm as well as the variance of this price and its
9The activist has only one target rm in our model. This assumption is made for convenience of
exposition.
10Mutual funds are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 which, among other things,
prevents them from selling short, borrowing, and holding concentrated positions. Hedge funds, by
having a small number of high net worth investors, are not subject to this Act, and, accordingly, are
not governed by the regulation of fees specied in the Act. See Brav et al. (2008, pp. 1734-1736)
for a discussion of di¤erences between mutual funds and hedge funds.
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covariance with prices of the other rms. In particular, we assume at time t = 1 that
the activist believes that the expected price per share of rm 1 will increase by m > 0
if he succeeds and remain the same otherwise. The expected values of the remaining
rms are unchanged. The variance of the price of rm 1; as well as the covariances
of the price of rm 1 with the other rms, might also change. Thus, we assume that
the covariance matrix of prices might change in the rst row and rst column if the
activist succeeds and would remain the same otherwise.11
We introduce the following notation. The subscript  1 is used for a vector or
matrix to denote that vector or matrix without its rst element or rst row, respec-
tively, e.g., the N x 1 vector v; with rst element v1; is written as v0= (v1;v0 1): We
let 
 10 = (!
1; :::;!N) =
0@ !11 !10 1
!1 1 R
1A where R is a positive denite N   1 x N   1
symmetric matrix. The omission of the rst row of the matrix 
 10 will be written
as 
 1 1;0: If we dene the N x N matrix V =
0@ v1 v0 1
v 1 0
1A and  as the probability
that the activist will succeed in his plans, the activist approaches the market at t = 1
with parameters 11= 0+me1 and 
11 = 
0 + V where e1 is an N x 1 vector
with 1 in the rst position and zeros elsewhere. The other investors remain with
their previous information, i.e., i1= 0 and 
i1 = 
0; i = 2; :::;M:We next present
a lemma that permits us to solve explicitly for the inverse needed to determine the
equilibrium price changes in Proposition 2.
In what follows, we let (P1  P0)0 = ((P1 P0)1; :::; (P1 P0)N); where (P1 P0)j
is the jth component of P1   P0: Scalar components for other vectors are indicated
in a similar manner.
Lemma. The N x 1 vectors x0 = (x1;x0 1) and z
0 = (z1; z0 1) and the matrix
11For example, Cli¤ord (2007), Bratton (2007) and Boyson and Mooradian (2011) nd evidence
that hedge fund activism is concentrated in particular industries.
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M = [I    x0
v 1z0

] satisfy M[I+V
 10 ] = I where
x1 =
1
c
[v0!1   !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1)]
x 1 =
1
c
[
 1 1;0v   
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)
(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
!1 1]
z1 =
!11
c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
z 1 =
1
c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
[(1 + v0!1)!1 1   !11
 1 1;0v]
c = 1 + v0!1   2!11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1) and
0 <   1:
SinceM[I+V
 10 ] = I; it follows that

 1
0 M is the inverse of [
0+V]: Because
this latter matrix is assumed to be positive denite, its inverse must have positive
diagonal elements. It follows that the upper left diagonal element of 
 10 M must be
positive and this can only happen if c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1) > 0: For the remainder of the
paper we assume that the parameters satisfy c > 0 and 1 + v0 1!
1
 1 > 0:
This lemma allows us to present the equilibrium prices at t = 1 explicitly. We do
this in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. At time t = 1, 11= 0+me1 and
11 = 
0+V; and i1= 0
and 
i1 = 
0; i = 2; :::;M: Then the equilibrium prices can be written as
(P1  P0)1 = g1
and
(P1  P0) 1 =  g2v 1
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where
g1 =
d1
cd
[m  v01=d+ 1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)]
g2 =
d1
cd
[
!11
1 + v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + 1
d
(
1 + v0!1
1 + v0 1!
1
 1
)] and
 =
d  d1
d
:
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate the result of the surreptitious acquisition of
shares by the activist.12 The activists predictions of the changes that his activism
would produce caused him to seek to alter his portfolio holdings consistent with
his predictions. Because this alteration of shares had to be acquired in the market
and because his view of future prices was di¤erent from other investors, the market
exchange was characterized by a heterogeneous information equilibrium. Under these
conditions, the two propositions establish the relationship between his predictions
and their impact on prices and the holdings of all market participants at t = 1. In
particular, Proposition 3 shows how changes in the variance or covariances e¤ect both
the price change of rm 1 and all prices connected to rm 1: Furthermore, Proposition
2 extends this observation to the holdings themselves.
In our model, we have chosen to abstract from the normal activities of the ac-
tivist, for example, from attempting to acquire representation on the board, changing
dividend policy, changing CEO salary, and/or selling parts of the rm, etc. Instead,
we have chosen to characterize activities into ways in which they alter the future
distribution of prices. Specically, some activities will a¤ect the mean, others the
variance and still others the covariance of the target rm with other rms. Indeed,
some activities will a¤ect these three features in various combinations.
Should the activist believe that the result of his activism would have no additional
12Note that hedge funds with less than $100 million in assets are not subject to quarterly reports,
needing only to le Schedule 13D as required.
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e¤ect on the covariances between rm 1 and the remaining rms, i.e., v 1 = 0; then
from Proposition 3, it follows immediately that prices other than the price of shares
of the rst rm would not change. However, using Proposition 2 under the condition
that v 1 = 0; we note that holdings for all investors change nevertheless. That is,
a rebalancing of portfolios occurs for all investors even though only the price of the
shares of the target rm changes.
Examining the change in the price of the shares of rm 1 exhibited in Proposition
3, it is not clear, in general, that the price increases without imposing some further
conditions. These conditions will be claried when, after discussing the remaining
two equilibria, we address the preliminary decision that the activist would have had
to have made to become an activist in the rst place. We will then show how these
conditions impose further constraints on our model. We need to delay the discussion
for the following reason. Under the assumptions that the activist will have acquired
additional shares, he will be able to begin his e¤orts to alter the direction of the rm.
This, however, has come at a cost of acquiring these additional shares that can be
written as P01(x

11   x01): In the initial decision as to whether to become an activist,
the activist must consider this cost against the expected revenue he will subsequently
receive when he has nished his activist activities and sells his extra shares on the
market at t = 3. Indeed, this would be the necessary condition for his activism.
Obviously, this initial decision will depend on the fact that the expected revenue
at time t = 3 exceeds this cost plus whatever other costs the activist may incur in
connection with his activist agenda.
Assuming the activist has acquired su¢ cient shares at t = 1; then at t = 2; he
les Schedule 13D. With the release of information contained in his ling of Schedule
13D, all investors, except for the activist, institute a trading round based on this new
information. The activist will not be involved in this trading round since we assume
his acquisition of additional shares was predicated on the fact that he would continue
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to hold shares long enough to execute his plan.13 Thus, the trading round at time
t = 2 is again one of homogeneous information, but with the number of shares held
by the activist excluded from the competition.
More precisely, at time t = 2, the activist does not trade and each of the other
investors learns of the information held by the activist. Thus, at this time we have
M   1 investors sharing the same information i2 = 0+me1 and 
i2 = 
0+V;
i = 2; :::;M: The result of this competition is contained in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. At time t = 2, the activist does not trade, and i2 = 0 + me1
and 
i2 = 
0 + V; i = 2; :::;M: Then the equilibrium solution yields xi2 = x

i1 for
i = 2; :::;M; and P2 = 0 + me1   1d d1 (
0+V)(1  x

11):
Proposition 4 establishes the fact that the new information acquired by the re-
maining investors when the activist abstains from the trading has no impact on their
holdings. The intuition for this result is as follows. The activist would not wish to sell
his recently acquired shares in rm 1 since this would undermine his purpose as an
activist. Given this point, he would not wish to trade his shares in other rms either,
since he already optimized his holdings in these rms in conjunction with his purchase
of additional shares in rm 1 using his private information. In fact, he would be at a
disadvantage to trade in a market in which all investors had the same information as
he did. On the other hand, the other investors, having been alerted to the possible
activism by the Schedule 13D ling and now perhaps wanting more of the shares of
rm 1, can only get those shares from among themselves. In their attempt to get
more shares, the prices will change. At these changed prices, however, it becomes
optimal for these other investors to end up with portfolios identical to the ones they
13See Cli¤ord (2007) who nds that hedge funds do not seem to buy or sell additional shares when
they change from a passive status to an active one, although that change in status necessitates a
ling of Schedule 13D.
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selected at time t = 1:
Subsequently, at time t = 3, there is new information since it becomes known as to
whether or not the activist was successful. The distributional parameters held by all
market participants then are either 0+me1 and 
0+V if the activist was successful,
or0 and
0 otherwise. At this point, the activist is involved in the trading since there
is no further informational advantage from holding the portfolio acquired at t = 1:
Thus, all investors participate in a homogenous information equilibrium. Should this
equilibrium result in the sale of shares in rm 1, then at this time Schedule 13D/A is
led by the activist, acknowledging the change in his ownership. The next proposition
provides the results.
Proposition 5. At t = 3, if the activist is successful, i3 = 0+me1 and 
i3 =

0+V: At t = 3; if the activist is not successful, i3 = 0 and 
i3 = 
0; i = 1; :::;M:
In either case, xi3 = x

i0 =
di
d
1: If the activist is successful, the equilibrium price
P3 = 0+me1 1d(
0+V)1; if the activist is unsuccessful, the equilibrium price is
P3 = P0:
One interesting feature of Proposition 5 is that whether successful or not at t = 3;
the activist chooses to sell the additional shares he acquired at t = 1 in rm 1: That
is, there is no way for the activist, if successful, to take advantage of the improved
distribution of prices. This follows since all investors now know of his success, and
thus the combined demand forces this result in equilibrium.
The derivation of the equilibria was predicated on an initial decision made by the
activist: the decision to become an activist or not. In the next Section we discuss
how this preliminary decision was made.
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3 The Decision to Become an Activist
In our model, the activist approaches the decision to become an activist with a pre-
sumption of how the value of the target rm, as well as the value of other rms,
would change as a result of his activism. This is summarized by the parameters of his
subjective probability distribution of the future value of the target as well as other
rms in the market. Under what conditions does this distribution warrant activism?
We assume that the activist needs to be convinced before proceeding of two issues.
In order to be a successful activist, he must expect to acquire a foothold in the target
rm from which to act. Thus, before time t = 1; he must believe that at time
t = 1; when surreptitiously seeking additional ownership in the target rm, he will
indeed be able to acquire such additional ownership. Using the notation established
above, the rst condition that we impose for proceeding to activism, CA1, is that
(x11   x10)1 > 0:14 Believing CA1 to be satised, the activist must further expect
that the cost of acquiring the foothold will be o¤set by the gain made when he exits
the target rm at time t = 3: Thus, the second condition that we impose, CA2, is
that the expected cash ow over the life of the activists involvement in the target
rm be positive. Using our notation, we next evaluate the expected cash ows.
From Proposition 5, it follows that the cash ow to the activist resulting from
the equilibrium at time t = 3 is P03(x

11   x13): Since x13 = x10; this cash ow
can be written as P03(x

11   x10): Recall that the cost to the activist at t = 1 for
acquiring additional shares in the target rm was P01(x

10   x11): Thus, the cash ow
to the activist from t = 1 to t = 3 is (P3   P1)0(x11   x10): This can be written as
[(P3  P0)  (P1  P0)]0(x11   x10): Since (P3  P0) can take one of two values, the
cash ow equals (me1   1dV1)0(x11   x10)   (P1   P0)]0(x11   x10) if the activist is
successful, and equals  (P1 P0)]0(x11 x10) otherwise. Thus, the second condition
14We could have imposed the requirement (x11   x10)1 >  > 0 but for convenience chose  = 0:
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for proceeding to activism, CA2, is that the activist would proceed only if the expected
cash ow were positive, that is, if
E(P3  P1)0(x11   x10) = (me1  
1
d
V1)0(x11   x10)  (P1  P0)0(x11   x10) > 0:
Together, we call these two conditions for activism CA, and note that CA places a
constraint on the parameters that the potential activist brings to the problem. Only
when CA is satised, will the activist proceed. We now rewrite CA to exhibit its
dependency on the fundamental parameters. Using Propositions 2 and 3, we can
rewrite CA1 as [g1!11   g2v0 1!1 1] > 0: Using Propositions 2 and 3, we can also
rewrite CA2 as [(m   v01=d)   g1)](x11   x10)1 + (g2   =d)v0 1(x11   x10) 1 > 0:
Since (x11 x10)1 > 0 by CA1, we can write CA2 as (m v01=d) g1 (d g2) > 0
where  = v 1(x

11 x10) 1
(x11 x10)1 :
To illustrate CA, we o¤er the following example. Suppose the potential activist
intends to alter the target rm in ways that increase shareholder value by inuencing
the way management decisions are made. If, in our example, we exclude those deci-
sions of management that involve selling all or part of the rm, or merging it with
another rm, decisions that alter the covariance of the target with other rms, then
our example is one in which the activists activities are those that will a¤ect the fu-
ture mean and variance of the value of the target. Examples of these types of activist
activities include cost cutting, general operational e¢ ciency, obtaining board repre-
sentation, and increased dividend payouts. Each of these activities might increase the
expected future value of the target. Corresponding to an increase in expected value
is a change in the precision of the estimate of this increase, i.e., the change in the
variance of the forecast. This change in forecast accuracy can yield a more precise
overall prediction if, for instance, the existing management agrees with the activities
proposed by the activist. On the other hand, if, in order to carry forth his intentions,
the activist must come into conict with management, the outcome might become
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more uncertain. The salient feature of this example, put in terms of the parameters
of the probability distribution of the future price of the target rm as well as other
rms, is that v 1 = 0: This leaves two distributional parameters to be specied: m;
the increase in future value, and v1; the increase or decrease in the variance of that
future value. The condition CA determines the relationship between these two values
that permits the activist to proceed, as we now demonstrate.
We rst evaluate the functions g1 and g2 under the condition that v 1 = 0: Using
Proposition 3, g1 = d1cd (m   v1=d) and g2 = d1cd [!11(m   v1=d) + 1d(1 + v1!11)]: It
now follows that if c = 1 + v1!11 > 0 and if (m   v1=d) > 0; then CA1 is satised
and g1 > 0: Combining these two inequalities, it follows that if   1!11 < v1 < md;
then CA1 is satised. Examining inequality CA2 ; this inequality, when combined
with CA1 is satised if (m  v1=d)(1  d1cd ) > 0 or if c > d1=d: Since c = 1 + v1!11;
we have that c > d1=d if v1 >   1!11 : Finally, since  
1
!11
<   1
!11
; condition CA is
satised if m and v1 satisfy   1!11 < v1 < md:
The term (m  v1=d) can be interpreted as the marginal risk-adjusted value that
the activist could create. Also, from Proposition 3, (P1   P0)1 = g1 > 0 and since
 = 0; CA2 implies that (P3 P1)1 = (m v1=d) g1 > 0: Thus, in order to proceed
in this simple example, the activist must believe that the changes that he could induce
will produce a risk-adjusted increase in value su¢ cient to yield an increase in the price
of the target rm at time t = 1; and, at a minimum, to further increase the price of
the target rm at time t = 3: The intuitive simplicity of these requirements follow
from allowing the changes due to activism to a¤ect the target rm and that rm
alone.
When the impact of activism changes the relationship of the target to other rms
in the market, then the constraints imposed by CA become more complicated. We
will investigate this situation below. However, we point out that the condition CA
can be used by the potential activist as a criterion for the selection of the target rm.
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In considering various targets and calculating the expected cash ows that would
result from activism in each of these rms, the activist would obviously choose the
one which yields the highest cash ow. In our example above, the activist would
choose the target associated with the largest value of mk v1k=d; where k ranges over
the potential target rms and mk and v1k represent the corresponding parameters.
4 Price Movements over the Period of Activism
We now return to the general case and consider how the satisfaction of CA a¤ects the
subsequent prices. We begin by deriving the forecasts of our model and then compare
them with the price changes described in the empirical literature.
The next proposition establishes the relationship between acquiring a foothold in
the target rm and the change in price of that target rm from time t = 0 to t = 1:
Proposition 6. (P1  P0)1 > d1!11d2v
0
 1!
1
 1:
An important consequence of this proposition is that, depending on the sign of
v0 1!
1
 1; the target rm price change from time t = 0 to t = 1 may or may not be
positive. Furthermore, a negative price change, while still leading to a foothold in
the target rm, is not necessarily a deterrent from proceeding with activism. As can
be seen from the lower bound in Proposition 6, whether or not (P1   P0)1 must be
positive depends both on the changes in covariances of the target rm with other
rms and on the initial covariances between these rms. For instance, as illustrated
in the example in Section 3 above, when v 1 = 0; it follows that (P1 P0)1 > 0:We
now continue by investigating implications of CA on the remaining prices.
Proposition 7.
(1) (P2  P1)1 = [m  v01=d+ (x

11 x10)1
d d1 (v1 + )];
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(2) (P3  P1)1 =
8<: m  v01=d  g1 if P3 = P0 +me1   1dV1 g1 if P3 = P0 ;
(3) (P3 P2)1 =
8<: m  v01=d  g1   (P2  P1)1 if P3 = P0 +me1   1dV1 g1   (P2  P1)1 if P3 = P0 :
Notice that the sign of (P3   P1)1 could be positive or negative. Also, from
Proposition 6, the sign of (P1   P0)1 could be negative. Why would it be desirable
for the activist to proceed to gain a foothold when he expects the price at time t = 1
to decline over that at time t = 0 and faces the possibility that the price at time
t = 3 would subsequently fall? The answer, since CA2 is satised, is that in this
instance the activist gains at time t = 1; and the losses he incurs at time t = 3 are
less than the gains. The situation just described may not be typical and we impose
further conditions on our parameters so that (P1 P0)1 > 0; also allowing us to sign
all the prices. Additionally, we focus on the case where (P1   P0)1 > 0 since this
comports with that studied in the empirical literature. Since we are assuming that
the activist has proceeded, for the remainder of the paper we assume that condition
CA is satised.
Proposition 8. Let v0 1!
1
 1 > 0; (v
0
 1!
1
 1)
2  !11v0 1Rv 1 and v1   v
0
 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
:
Then
(1) (P1  P0)1 > 0;
(2) (P2  P1)1 > 0;
(3)
8>>><>>>:
There exists a constant k1 > 0 such that
(P3  P1)1  0 if P3 = P0 +me1   1dV1 and d1dc  k1
(P3  P1)1 < 0 if P3 = P0
;
(4)
8>>><>>>:
There exists a constant k2 > 0 such that
(P3  P2)1  0 if P3 = P0 +me1   1dV1 and   k2
(P3  P2)1 < 0 if P3 = P0
:
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We see from Propositions 7(1) and 8(2) that the increase in the price of the target
rm at time t = 2 over t = 1 depends on what we call the risk adjusted mean,
m   v01=d; the change in the variance of the price of the target rm and a function
dependent on all of the changes in the covariances, i.e., :
Propositions 6 through 8 describe the sequence of changes in the price of the target
rm conditional upon the constraints imposed by the activist in order to proceed.
The usefulness of the generality of these results can be seen in the relationship to the
empirical work on activism mentioned above. For example, in one-quarter to one-
third of the instances of activism examined by Brav et al. (see p. 1755), Klein and
Zur (see Table IV) and Cli¤ord (see Table IV), the price of the target rm declines
around the time of the ling of Schedule 13D (our times t = 1 and t = 2), consistent
with our Proposition 6. Our model supplies a possible explanation for these cases
in which the activist proceeds to become an activist despite the expectation of a
decline in the price of the target rm at time t = 1: However, in the majority of cases
considered in the literature, the target price at this time increases. It is based on
this increase that the literature broadly concludes that the impact of activism on the
market is positive.
The results of Proposition 8 exhibit a sequence of prices for the target rm de-
rived from our model. Each of the prices in this sequence is a result of an equilibrium
generated by new information. Initially the activist brought new information (sur-
reptitiously) to the market at time t = 1: Under the assumed conditions, this caused
the price of the target rm to rise. Then, after the ling of Schedule 13D, the ac-
tivists intentions were revealed to the market place yielding the equilibrium price at
time t = 2: This equilibrium caused another increase in the price of the target rm.
Finally, when information about the activists success or failure became known, the
equilibrium price at time t = 3 was determined. No further change in price occurred
between t = 2 and t = 3 since we assumed that no further information was forthcom-
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ing in that interval. With the information available at time t = 3; the equilibrium
price of the target rm was shown to exceed the equilibrium price at time t = 1 when
the activist was successful, and exceed the equilibrium price at time t = 2 in this
case as well. However, if the activist were unsuccessful, the equilibrium price of the
target rm at time t = 3 falls below the equilibrium prices at both t = 1 and t = 2:
Proposition 8 predicts that the prole of prices of the target rm over the period of
activism due to activism has the following shape: a stark increase around the time of
the Schedule 13D ling (t = 1 and t = 2), the price remaining at that elevated level
until knowledge of the success or failure of the activist becomes available (t = 3);
and the price subsequently rising or falling depending on the success or failure of the
activist.
We next show that the forecast of the sequence of prices given in Proposition 8
reasonably coincides with the average performance of target rm prices that forms the
focus of the recent empirical literature. In that literature, we observe that signicant
average abnormal returns for the target rm around the ling of Schedule 13D are
prominent ndings in the studies of Brav et al. (see Figure 1 for an illustration), Klein
and Zur, Boyson and Mooradian, Cli¤ord, and Greenwood and Schor.15 While earlier
studies, for example, Black, Karpo¤, and Gillian and Starks, found scant evidence of
the impact of activism, the newer empirical studies focus on the release of information
by hedge funds (and other entrepreneurial activists) via their Schedule 13D lings.
Viewed from the prospective of our theoretical model, it is this shift in focus of
the newer empirical work to the release of new information by the hedge funds and
others to the market place that permits these studies to discover the positive average
15To our knowledge, the only recent study not providing evidence of this price increase at the time
of announcement is Becht et al. in the context of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund that, as noted above,
does not announce its acquisitions as a separate entity, but rather has its acquisitions announced,
along with others, by a parent group.
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abnormal returns around the ling event. Furthermore, from the perspective of our
model, the relative constancy of positive abnormal returns of the targets during the
year following the Schedule 13D ling event noted in recent studies (in particular, see
Brav et al., and Klein and Zur), also is quite natural as no new information has been
released during this time period; hence, our model would predict no price changes.
When new information later becomes available, specically the knowledge of
whether the activist has been successful or not, recent empirical ndings suggest
that the target rms price declines with evidence of failure and rises with evidence
of success. In particular, see, Brav et al., Figure 2, where they show that, for ac-
tivist hedge funds that exit the target (and le Schedule 13D/A) after failure, prices
decline. Although not shown explicitly in their Figure 2, the subset of activists that
exit (ling Schedule 13D/A) after success exhibit price increases. This comports with
our models prediction that when success or failure of the activist becomes known
and the activist exits the target rm, the price of the target will increase in instances
of success and fall (revert to the original benchmark price) in instances of failure.16
In sum, our model is able to predict both the positive and negative price move-
ments of target rms exhibited in the empirical literature. Under appropriate as-
sumptions (Proposition 8), our model is able to predict the average price movements
that form the basis of discussion in that literature. In fact, the behavior of the average
price (mean or median) is the basis used in the literature for arguing the benets of
activism. These benets, it is argued, follow from the increase in the target rms
price from time t = 0 to t = 1; which implies an immediate increase in shareholder
value. Our approach, which focuses on diversied investors over the entire period of
16Slightly di¤erent ndings are described in Klein and Zur: they nd that when the activist exits
with success, the price of the target increases more than when he exits with failure. Perhaps these
di¤erences in the ndings arise as Klein and Zur study only confrontational hedge funds and other
entrepreneurial investors while Brav et al. study both confrontational and non-confrontational hedge
funds.
27
the activists involvement, raises questions about ascribing benets of activism based
only on the movements of the target rms price at time t = 1: It is with this in
mind that we turn to the question of evaluating the benets of activism. Having
demonstrated the reasonableness of the predictions of Proposition 8 in describing
the average price movements of the target rm, we retain the assumptions of that
proposition in evaluating the benets of activism.
5 Assessing Activisms Impact on the Market and
other Diversied Investors
Up to this point we have established the conditions that permit an activist to proceed,
and have shown the way in which information has a¤ected equilibrium prices over
the course of the activists involvement with the target rm. We have also shown
the conditions under which our model predicts target price movements consistent
with those found in the empirical literature. We now propose to use our model to
investigate several features that we believe ought to be considered in an evaluation of
activism. These features reect the notion that this evaluation should depend on the
way in which the outcome of the activists activities a¤ect the market as a whole.
Our model permits us to calculate the relationship between the outcome of ac-
tivism and the outcome on the market as a whole in two di¤erent ways. First, we
can compute the total change in market value between times t and  ; t > ; resulting
from activism, i.e., 10(Pt   P ): A positive assessment of activism, especially at the
time of the ling of Schedule 13D, t = 1; might require that an increase in the target
price at that time should yield 10(P1   P0) > 0: Additionally, the assessment might
include that the total change in the market value from t = 0 to t = 3 be positive
under the assumption that the activist were successful. In the context of diversied
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portfolio holders, these assumptions include consideration of the impact of activism
on other rms held in the portfolios.17
Second, an evaluation of activism should consider the impact of activism on all
other participants in the market. The activists involvement in the rm is predicated
on the assumption that it will earn an expected prot over the course of his activism.
Indeed, our condition CA is an expression of this expectation. CA2 implies that the
activist would expect to earn E(P3 P1)0(x11 x10): But what would the expectation
be for the group of other investors? If we let xGt =
MP
j=2
xjt; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; then the
expected cash ow of the group of other investors over the period of activism is
E(P3   P1)0(xG1   xG0). A positive assessment of activism over the period might
require that when this expectation of the activist is positive, so should the expectation
of the group of other investors. We next apply these criteria to activism as described
in our model, beginning with the rst criterion.
Proposition 9. Let g1 > 0:
(1) At time t = 1, there exists a constant ; v0 1!
1
 1 <  < v
0
 1!
1
 1+
1

; such that
(a) (P1  P0)1 > 0 and 10(P1  P0) > 0 if !1 1v0 11 1 < 
(b) (P1  P0)1 > 0 and 10(P1  P0)  0 if !1 1v0 11 1  :
(2) At time t = 3; if the activist is successful
(a) 10(P3  P0) > 0 if 1dv
0
 11 1 <
1
2
(m  v1=d)
(b) 10(P3  P0)  0 if 1dv
0
 11 1 >
1
2
(m  v1=d):
(3) At time t = 3; if the activist is not successful, 10(P3  P0) = 0:
Since v0 11 1 is proportional to the average change of the covariances due to
activism, Proposition 9 demonstrates the importance of the size of this average in
17We note that in their model of diversied investors, Hansen and Lott (1996) emphasize that, in
the presence of externalities, the appropriate objective of analysis is the portfolio, in which spillovers
can be incorporated, rather than the individual stock prices and their responses to announcements.
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determining the direction of change of the market value. Note that when v 1 = 0;
the rst of the cases at t = 1 prevails, and it follows that at that time, a rise in
the price of the target rm is coincident with a rise in the market. It su¢ ces for
this conclusion to hold if v0 11 1 = 0 and v
0
 1!
1
 1  0: From the proof of part (1)
of Proposition 9, we conclude that, if v0 11 1 is su¢ ciently negative, then increases
in the price of the target rm and that of the market will both occur. A similar
conclusion follows from part (2) of Proposition 9, where at time t = 3; these two
positive price changes will occur for small values of v0 11 1: However, the importance
of this proposition is to show that, whether at the time of the ling of Schedule 13D,
t = 1; or at the exit of the activist, t = 3; the direction of the change in the market
cannot be determined only by the direction of the price change in the target rm.
Specically, the changes in the covariance structure caused by activism must also be
taken into account in order to ascertain the impact of activism on the market.
A general conclusion of recent empirical studies of hedge fund and other entrepre-
neurial activism (see, for example, Brav et al., Klein and Zur, Boyson and Mooradian,
and Cli¤ord) is that shareholders benet from activism. The evidence presented to
support this claim is that at the time of the Schedule 13D ling, the price of the target
rm increases and stays elevated for about a year afterwards. But shareholders are
not typically shareholders in the target rm exclusively, but rather are typically diver-
sied investors. From the standpoint of diversied investors, the benets of activism
should be analyzed in the context not only on their impact on the price of the target
rm, but also in conjunction with their impact on the value of all the holdings of all
of the investors, that is, in conjunction with the value of the market. Our Proposition
9 shows that judging that activism benets shareholders simply because it increases
the price of the target rm is not su¢ cient for making an assessment that activism
benets diversied shareholders. In order to make that assessment, it is necessary to
know the changes in the covariances of the prices of the other rms with the target
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rm. As described above, on the basis of the average change of the covariances due
to activism, we can determine whether an increase in target price due to activism is
associated with an increase in the values of all the portfolios of all the investors in the
market. Only when the average change in the covariances due to activism is below a
positive constant ; can we conclude that an increase in the price of the target rm
ensures an increase in the value of the market. Thus, from our point of view, we nd
that while there is theoretical support for the empirical claim that a higher target
rm price due to activism means that shareholders benet from activism, this con-
clusion is only true under specic conditions on the average change of the covariances
due to activism. When these conditions are not met, an increase in the price of the
target rm will be associated with a fall in the value of the market, suggesting the
conclusion that activism in that case has a negative impact on the shareholders.
It is not surprising that the average changes in the covariances of the prices of
the other rms in the market relative to the target rm play a key role in assessing
whether the impact of activism is positive or negative on diversied shareholders.
Indeed, it would be odd if the covariance structure were irrelevant in this context.
Moreover, there are numerous instances in which the covariance structure becomes
meaningful in the strategy of the activist. See, for example Kahan and Rocks (pp.
1073-1075) description of AXAs proposed acquisition of MONY, and Lee and Park
who demonstrate the impact of activist behavior on the prices of other rms.18
18Other strategies that may exploit the covariance structure include those that make use of hidden
ownership (that is, economic ownership held without voting rights) and empty voting (that is, voting
exceeding economic ownership); see Hu and Black (2007). However, the use of derivatives, and in
particular, equity swaps, to mask the accumulation of shares that would necessitiate a 13D ling,
has been challenged in Federal Court in connection with a case involving The Childrens Investment
Fund and CSX; see, for example, Stowell (2010). According to Stowell (2010, p. 249), the 2008 ruling
in the CSX vs. The Childrens Investment Fund Management case "represents a strong challenge to
hedge funds who attempt to conceal their true economic position through the use of derivatives."
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But it is also appropriate to recall at this juncture that, as we showed in Propo-
sition 6 above, activism can proceed when the price of the target rm falls at the
time of the Schedule 13D announcement. This result, too, depends on the changes
in covariances of the target rm with other rms, as well as on the initial covariance
between the rms. Thus, although we do not explore the impact on the market value
when the price of the target rm falls at the Schedule 13D announcement (since all
the empirical conclusions are drawn with reference to an initial increase in the target
rm price), we conjecture that there would also be conditions under which the initial
fall in the target price would be associated with an increase in market value, thus pro-
viding an additional situation in which activism might be said to benet shareholders.
This conclusion cannot be drawn from the empirical literature that focuses solely on
the increase in the price of the target rm at time t = 1: Thus, whether the initial
target price increases or decreases, the relationship of that change to the change in
the value of the market is contingent on changes in the covariance structure.
Even in cases where the increase in the price of the target rm is coincident with
an increase in the value of the market, the source of this increase is undetermined.
Since the market is made up of both the activist and the group of other investors,
the increase in the market value could be caused by both increasing or either one
increasing. To separate these possibilities, we next evaluate the impact of activism
on the portfolios of the group of other investors.
Proposition 10.
(1) E(P3  P1)0(xG1   xG0) =  E(P3  P1)0(x11   x10):
We note that more recently, the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, considering the same case,
left unsettled exactly under what circumstances cash-settled total equity swap agreements provide
benecial ownership. In the context of the Dodd-Frank Act, since section 766(b) amends Sections
13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act, this issue remains not fully settled. See Cuillerier and Hall
(2011).
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(2) If, at time t = 3; the activist is successful, (P3   P1)0(xG1   xG0) =  (P3  
P1)
0(x11   x10) where P3 is given by Proposition 5.
As we see from Proposition 10, regardless of the change in market value, if the
activists expected cash ow is positive over the period of activism, then the expected
cash ow to the group of other investors over the same period is negative. Further-
more, this result holds at time t = 3 when it is known that the activist is successful.
Though Proposition 10 is disheartening, it does not imply that every other investor
loses money over the period. It is only the group as a whole for which this is true.
Proposition 10 is seemingly at odds with a major conclusion drawn in the empirical
literature surveyed above. This conclusion, which is that activism benets sharehold-
ers, is based on the observation that the price of the target rm increases around the
time of the Schedule 13D ling (t = 1) and does not decrease for approximately a
year (t = 3). While this conclusion might be valid for a shareholder in the target
rm who had shares in the target rm and held those shares throughout the period
of activism, it cannot hold for the group of shareholders. Some of that group had to
have sold shares in order that the activist could acquire shares and proceed with his
plan, and some of that group had to have repurchased shares when the activist exited
the target rm. What Proposition 10 demonstrates is that, as a group, shareholders
pay for any prot that the activist might make.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The types of activities that activists assert they will undertake in their Schedule 13D
lings are varied. In this paper we abstract from these activities, considering instead
the manner in which these activities alter the joint distribution of the future value
of the target rm as well as other rms in the market. For instance, an activity that
leads to cost reduction is interpreted in our model as an increase in the expected value
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of the target rm. If this cost reduction were accompanied by antagonism with the
existing board, this increase in expectation could be accompanied by an increase in
the variance of the target rm price. An activity such as the sale of part of the target
rm is interpreted as a change in the covariance of the target rm within other rms
correlated with it. From the onset of activism until the departure of the activist,
this type of abstraction permits us to derive, at points of release of new information,
the sequence of equilibria prices of all rms in the market as well as the sequence of
equilibria holdings of all participants in the market.
By examining the sequence of equilibria, we nd that the activist induces changes
in the price of the target rm and possibly in the prices of other rms as well. These
changes lead to a redistribution of holdings of all shareholders in those rms. In
fact, we nd that at each point of new information, equilibrium is accompanied by a
redistribution of shares of all market participants. An illustration of the consequences
of an activists activity on other rms is found in Lee and Park who describe the
impact of the behavior of a target rm on the prices of non-target rms.
We next focus on the sequence of equilibrium prices corresponding to the target
rm. We show that, while it is possible for the price of the target rm to increase
around the 13D announcement date and remain elevated for the period of the activists
involvement in the rm, it is also possible that activism leads to a decline in the price
of the target rm around the date of the 13D announcement and that the price may
remain lower for the remainder of the period. Though not discussed in the literature,
this latter case has been observed in Brav et al., Klein and Zur, and Cli¤ord. Changes
in prices other than in the target rm lead to the possibility that the activist could
prot in his portfolio due to activism, but not improve the value of the target rm.
We then focus on the case discussed in the literature and show the conditions under
which an increase in target rm price would prevail.
Focusing on the interests of the activist, we next consider the criteria used by an
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activist to become an activist. We assume that to proceed an activist must believe (1)
that he can acquire su¢ cient ownership in the target rm and (2) that the expected
cost of acquiring the needed additional shares will be o¤set by the expected gain he
will make when he exits the target rm. In fact, these criteria can be used by the
activist to select among potential target rms by choosing the one that maximizes
the expected cash ow. The application of these criteria might explain why, in the
preponderance of cases when the activist proceeds, he is successful (see Brav et al.,
Klein and Zur, and Bratton (2010)). However, it does not follow that the satisfaction
of these criteria implies that the price of the target rm will increase over the period
of activism.
Recognizing that an activist might or might not increase the value of the target
rm, but will change the portfolios of all investors as well as his own portfolio, the
question arises as to how to evaluate the impact of activism. We answer this by
assuming that such an evaluation must depend on two relationships: rst, the rela-
tionship between changes in the target rm price due to activism and changes in the
market, and second, the relationship between the cash ows accruing to the activist
and those accruing to the remainder of the market investors. We establish that the
increase in the price of the target rm does not, by itself, determine the direction of
change of the market.
It can be shown that when the activities of the activist lead to a su¢ cient reduction
of the covariance between the target rm and other rms, then an increase in the price
of the target rm will lead to an increase in the value of the market. Some evidence
of this occurring can be found in Cli¤ord (Table V) and Brav et al. (p. 1731), where
they observe that the highest abnormal returns occur when the activist spins o¤ non-
core assets, changing the covariance structure. Conversely, we establish conditions
where the activities yield an increase in the target rms price but a decrease in the
corresponding market value.
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Even in the case in which the value of the market increases with activism, it is
not clear who benets from this increase. We next show that if the activist makes a
prot over the course of his involvement with the target rm, this prot occurs at the
expense of the remaining group of investors over that period. Although this does not
imply that each investor would lose when the activist gains, it does deny the claim
that successful activism benets shareholders.
Why does the activist seem to have an advantage over other investors? The an-
swer seems to be two-fold. First, the activist must have su¢ cient funds to acquire
the necessary foothold in the target rm. Second, the activist must believe that his
behavior would alter the future value of the rm. As a result, the activist approaches
the market surreptitiously with this private information. Thus his acquisition of own-
ership comes at the expense of the ignorance of the other market participants, giving
the activist an advantage. This advantage is similar in avor to insider information.
It has been observed that the activist does not succeed in his plans approximately
one-third of the time (see Brav et al., Klein and Zur, and Bratton (2010)). When he
does not succeed, we show that neither the activist nor the other investors benet
nancially. However, the volatility of the price of the target rm, as well as possibly
other prices, increases over the period of activism.
In sum, we are left with no clear-cut argument showing the benets of activism
beyond those accruing to the activist. Since the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on
Section 13d requirements is currently under discussion, we o¤er the following pro-
posals suggested by our model. First, the 10 day delay time before ling Schedule
13D should be shortened. Second, no exemptions from ling Schedule 13D announce-
ments should be allowed. Third, the use of derivatives etc., to obscure benecial
ownership should be precluded. Finally, restrictions on coalitions of activists should
be implemented to prevent gaming.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. In Rabinovitch and Owen (1978; hereafter RO) they
proved that, under the assumptions we have made concerning utilities and distrib-
utions, the equilibrium solution for the general heterogeneous portfolio problem can
be written as xi1 = di

 1
i1 [i1 P1] where di = 1=ai and where P1 is chosen to sat-
isfy
MP
i=1
xi1 = 1: Evaluating the RO solution under the present assumptions yields

11x

11 = d1(11 P1) and for i > 1; 
0xi1 = di(0 P1): It follows that
x11 x10= x11 d1d 1 = d1
 111 (11  
111=d P1)
= d1

 1
11 (0 +   (
0 + 
)1=d P1)
= d1

 1
11 (P0  P1 +  
1=d):
Also, xi1 xi0 = xi1 did 1 = di
 10 (0  
01=d P1)
= di

 1
0 (P0 P1):
Summing over i = 1; :::;M; we have
0 = (d  d1)
 10 (P0 P1) + d1
 111 (P0  P1 +  
1=d) or
[(d  d1)
 10 + d1
 111 ](P1 P0) = d1
 111 ( 
1=d) or
[(dI + (d  d1)

 10 ](P1 P0) = d1( 
1=d):
From above, x11   x10 = d1
 111 (P0 P1) + d1
 111 ( 
1=d)
=  d1
 111 (P1 P0) + [(d  d1)
 10 + d1
 111 ](P1 P0)
= (d  d1)
 10 (P1 P0):
Since we established above that for i > 1; xi1   xi0 =  di
 10 (P1 P0); the
proposition is proved.
Proof of Lemma. We must show that
h
I    (x1;x0 1)
v 1(z1;z0 1)
i h
I + 
  v0
 10
v 1!10
i
= I:
We begin by solving for x: It must satisfy  (x1;x0 1)
v 1(z1;z0 1)

+
 v0
 10
v 1!10
  x1v0
 10 +(x0 1v 1)!10
v 1(z1v0
 10 +(z
0
 1v 1)!1
0 )

=
0: It follows that
x1 = v
0!1   x1v0!1   (x0 1v 1)!11
x 1 = 
 1 1;0v   x1
 1 1;0v   (x0 1v 1)!1 1:
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Similarly,
z1 = !
1
1   z1v0!1   (z0 1v 1)!11
z 1 = !1 1   z1
 1 1;0v   (z0 1v 1)!1 1:
Pre-multiplying x 1through by the vector v0 1; we have
(v0 1x 1) = (1  x1)(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1) which implies
x 1 = (1  x1)
h

 1 1;0v  v
0
 1

 1
 1;0v
1+v0 1!
1
 1
!1 1
i
; and
x1 = v
0!1   x1v0!1 (1  x1) v
0
 1

 1
 1;0v
1+v0 1!
1
 1
!1 1:
Solving for x1 yields
x1 =
v0!1 !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1+v0 1!1 1)
1+[v0!1 !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1+v0 1!1 1)]
:
We let c = 1 + [v0!1   !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1)]:
The development of z proceeds in the same fashion yielding
z1 =
!11
c(1+v0 1!
1
 1)
and
z 1 = ( 1c(1+v0 1!1 1))[(1 + v
0!1)!1 1   !11
 1 1;0v]:
Proof of Proposition 3. FromProposition 2, we have [I+d d1
d


 10 ](P1 P0) =
d1
d
( 
1=d): From the Lemma, there exists an M such that P1 P0 =
d1
d
M( 
1=d) for  = d d1
d
: Substituting the values for  and 
; we
have
P1 P0 = d1
d
M[me1   1
d

v01
v 1q1

=
d1
d
M

m  v01=d
  q1
d
v 1

=
d1
d
f

m  v01=d
  q1
d
v 1

  

(x1;x
0
 1)
v 1(z1; z0 1)

m  v01=d
  q1
d
v 1

g
=
d1
d
[

(1  x1)(m  v01=d) +  q1d x0 1v 1
 v 1[z1(m  v01=d)] + q1d (1  z0 1v 1)

]:
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Substituting from the proof of the Lemma, we have
P1 P0 = d1
dc

m  v01=d+  q1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)
 v 1[ !
1
1
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + q1
d
(c+
2!11
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v))]

=
d1
dc

m  v01=d+  q1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)
 v 1[ !
1
1
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + q1
d
(1 + v0!1)]

=

g1
 v 1g2

:
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the homogeneous information set, the equilib-
rium solution would be xi2 =
di
d d1 (1  x11) andP2 = 0+me1  1d d1 (
0+V)(1  x

11):
But from the proof of Proposition 2, for i > 1; 
0xi1 = di(0   P1) which implies
that (1  x11)=(d  d1) = 
 10 (0 P1): Thus, after substitution, xi2 = xi1:
Proof of Proposition 5. At time t = 3, we have one of two possible homogeneous
equilibria. Again, Proposition 1 yields the result for the respective parameter values.
Proof of Proposition 6. CA implies that x11   x10 > 0: From Propositions 2
and 3, we have x11   x10 = (d   d1)[!11g1   g2(v0 1!1 1)]: Thus, CA implies !11g1 >
g2(v
0
 1!
1
 1): From Proposition 3, g2 can be written in terms of g1 as follows:
g2 =
!11
1 + v0 1!
1
 1
g1 +
d1
cd2(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
(1 + v0!1   2!11v0 1
 1 1;0v=(1 + v0 1!1 1)
=
!11
1 + v0 1!
1
 1
g1 +
d1
d2(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
:
It follows that !11g1 > g2(v
0
 1!
1
 1) if !
1
1g1 >
!11(v
0
 1!
1
 1)
1+v0 1!
1
 1
g1 +
d1(v0 1!
1
 1)
d2(1+v0 1!
1
 1)
or if
!11g1 >
d1(v0 1!
1
 1)
d2
: Since, by Proposition 3, g1 = (P1  P0)1; the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7.
(1) From Proposition 4, P2 = 0+me1  1d d1 (
0+V)(1  x

11): From the
proof of Proposition 2 it follows that (1   x11) =  (d   d1)
 10 (P1   0) so P2 =
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P1 + [me1  V1=d + V
 10 (P1   P0)] = P1 + [me1  V1=d + 1d d1V(x

11 x10)]:
So the rst component of P2  P1; (P2  P1)1 = [m  v01=d+ (x

11 x10)1
d d1 (v1 + )]:
(2) From Proposition 5, P3 P0 = me1 V1=d where the activist is successful
and 0 otherwise. So P3   P1 = P3   P0   (P1   P0): Thus, the rst component
of P3   P1; (P3   P1)1 = m   v01=d   g1 where the activist is successful and  g1
otherwise.
(3) From parts (1) and (2), (P3   P2)1 = (P3   P1)1   (P2   P1)1 and the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8.
(1) This part follows from Proposition 6 since v0 1!
1
 1 > 0:
(2) We rst show that  >
v0 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
: The di¤erence
   v
0
 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
=
g1(v
0
 1!
1
 1)  g2(v0 1Rv 1)
!11g1   g2v0 1!1 1
  v
0
 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
=
g1
v0 1!
1
 1(!
1
1g1   g2v0 1!1 1)
[(v0 1!
1
 1)
2   !11(v0 1Rv 1)]:
Because v0 1!
1
 1 > 0 and from part (1) g1 > 0 and by CA1, !
1
1g1  g2v0 1!1 1 > 0;
the last expression will be positive if v0 1!
1
 1 >
!11(v
0
 1Rv 1)
v0 1!
1
 1
which is assumed. It then
follows that  >
v0 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
> 0:
From CA2, the parameters must satisfy (m   V1=d)(x11   x10) > 1dv0 1(x11  
x10) 1 + (P1 P0)0(x11 x10): The right hand side of this inequality is positive since
 =
v0 1(x

11 x10) 1
(x11 x10)1 > 0 and (P1 P0)
0(x11 x10) = (d d1)(P1 P0)0
 10 (P1 P0) with

0 being a positive denite matrix. Finally, since m   v01=d > 0; from Proposition
7, (P2   P1)1 > (x

11 x10)1
d d1 (v1 + ) =
(x11 x10)1
d d1 [(v1 +
v0 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
) + (   v0 1Rv 1
v0 1!
1
 1
)]: Our
assumptions make each term in parentheses positive, proving part (2).
(3) From Proposition 7(2), it follows that (P3   P1)1 = m   v01=d   g1
if the activist succeeds. Using Proposition 3, (P3   P1)1 = m   v01=d   d1dc [m  
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v01=d+ 
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 +v
0
 1!
1
 1)]: It follows that if
d1
dc
is su¢ ciently small, that
(P3   P1)1 > 0: Also, from Proposition 7(2). when the activist does not succeed,
(P3  P1)1 =  g1; which is negative by part (1).
(4) From Propositions 7(1) and (2), when the activist is successful, g1 +
(P2  P1)1 is a positive multiple of : Thus, for  su¢ ciently small, (P3  P2)1 will
be positive from Proposition 7(3). When the activist is not successful (P3 P2)1 < 0;
also from Proposition 7(3).
Proof of Proposition 9.
(1) Because of CA1 and Proposition 6, we require that g1 > d1d2!11
v0 1!
1
 1:
In order for the market to increase at time t = 1 at the same time that the target
rm price increases, we further require that 10(P1   P0) = g1   g2v0 11 1 > 0 and
g1 > 0: We showed in the proof of Proposition 6 that g2 = 11+v0 1!1 1
(!11g1 +
d1
d2
): Thus, the requirement that the market increases can be written as g1[1 +
(v0 1!
1
 1   !11v0 11 1)] > d1d2 v0 11 1: We consider the three mutually exhaustive
cases !11v
0
 11 1  v0 1!1 1; v0 1!1 1 < !11v0 11 1 < v0 1!1 1 + 1 ; and !11v0 11 1 
v0 1!
1
 1 +
1

:
For the case !11v
0
 11 1  v0 1!1 1 it easily follows that the requirement that the
market increases is implied by CA1. Thus, for this case, the market increases when
the target rm price increases. For the case !11v
0
 11 1  v0 1!1 1 + 1 ; the left hand
side of the requirement that the market increases becomes negative. This implies that
the market would increase only if g1 < 0; which violates our assumption. Thus, in
this case, the market falls. For the case v0 1!
1
 1 < !
1
1v
0
 11 1 < v
0
 1!
1
 1 +
1

; when
the value of !11v
0
 11 1 is close to the left end of the interval, both inequalities can be
satised if
!11v
0
 11 1
1+(v0 1!
1
 1 !11v0 11 1) > v
0
 1!
1
 1: However, when the value of !
1
1v
0
 11 1 is
close to the right end of the interval, the value that g1 needs to exceed for the market
to rise goes to innity, implying that here the value of the market must fall. Therefore,
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there is a point in this interval where the two inequalities cannot simultaneously hold.
We let  be that point.
(2) At time t = 3; if the activist is successful, it follows from Proposition 5
that 10(P3 P0) = m v01=d  1dv0 11 1 = m v1=d 2v0 11 1 and the result follows.
(3) At time t = 3; if the activist is not successful, it follows from Proposition
5 that 10(P3  P0) = 0 and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 10.
(1) Earlier we showed that
E(P3  P1)0(x11   x10) = (me1  
1
d
V1)0(x11   x10)  (P1  P0)0(x11   x10) > 0:
Since
PM
i=1 x

ij = 1 for all j; (x

11   x10) =  (xG1   xG0) and the result follows.
(2) For P3 determined at time t = 3 if the activist is successful, the cash ow
to the activist is (me1  1dV1)0(x11 x10)  (P1 P0)0(x11 x10): The same argument
as above completes the proof.
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